The turning point for the recent growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
I. INTRODUCTION
Sub-Saharan Africa comprises 49 of the 54 countries in Africa -excluding North African countries of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia. For two decades following the oil shocks and worldwide stagflation of the late 1970s, except for a few countries, subSaharan Africa (SSA) -Africa hereafter -was a region of economic stagnation, poverty, war and conflict, and misgovernance. Average growth rate declined to about 2 percent. With population growth at 2 percent or higher, this amounted to zero or negative per capita growth. It was the long period of stagnation between mid-1970s and 1990s that Africa became known in the media as a basket case of the world. In 2000, the editors of the Economist magazine (May 13, 2000) described Africa as "The hopeless continent" in its lead editorial.
The usual image of Africa as economically stagnant and heavily dependent on charity and international aid began to turn around in mid-1990s. For more than a decade since 1995-1996, even with the 2008-2009 global financial crisis and Great Recession, Africa grew at an average of 5 percent per year (World Bank Online) and nearly one-quarter of the countries grew at 6 percent and higher. Growth dropped in the aftermath of the crisis, but quickly recovered in 2010 and is back to the growth trajectory of the 5-6 percent range (IMF, 2014) . This recent strong and persistent growth has attracted attention of the media, development practitioners, researchers, and policy makers. The dire prediction of a "hopeless continent," dependent on aid and charity began to change. By the end of 2011, the lead editorial of The Economist (December 3, 2011) changed its tone and labeled "Africa rising" on its cover. Many international investors, corporate leaders, and business no longer view Africa as a blanket hopeless continent, but as potential investment and business opportunities. The recent "Africa rising" narrative can be overly ambitious and as misguided as the dire portray of Africa as a hopeless continent in the past. Viewing Africa whole can be useful in certain analytical context. But understanding Africa parts is critical.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it analyzes the pattern of long-run growth based on available 1960-2014 time-series data. Second, as a result of growth dispersion among different countries, the paper explores the possibility of categorizing countries into groups: emerging strong-growth market economies and non-emerging economies in the context of sub-Saharan Africa. It tests the hypothesis that there are differences in key economic and institutional variables between the two groups. The next section briefly reviews the literature related to Africa's growth. Section III analyzes the pattern of Africa's growth. Section IV identifies a group of strong-growth emerging economies in Africa and test the hypothesis of whether the cluster of emerging growth economies is different from the rest in some economic fundamentals and quality of institutions and governance. Section V concludes with some policy implications.
II. Literature Review of Economic Growth in Africa
In the literature of development economics, the meaning of development is seen as complex and multidimensional. It is not only about economic growth (Seers, 1969) .
However, development practitioners and policy makers generally accept that economic growth is a critical and necessary dimension of development, if not sufficient. There is a large number of cross-country econometric studies that have attempted, in varying degrees of sophistication, to find some universal causal mechanisms of growth in developing countries -theoretical and prescriptive universalism as the law of gravity in nature. Following an extensive review of the literature, Kenny and Williams (2000) concluded that the results were disappointing in that no model has proven robust to trial by repeated regression. Africa's growth performance has often been captured by a regional dummy variable in these cross-country growth-regression models.
The Africa's growth problem in the literature grew out of the focus and debate of the role of international aid in the mid-1970s. It has gained a broader interest, especially from private businesses, investors, and academia in addition to international financial and donor community as the continent began to be rebranded from a "hopeless continent" to "rising Africa" in the media. Africa's earlier optimistic outlook following independence in the 1960s dissipated following the sudden oil price shocks; most economies in Africa faltered by mid-1970s. It followed by economic decline and stagnation during the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. Poor economic management, misgovernance, authoritarian leadership, violent conflicts and civil wars magnified the external shocks and macroeconomic instability. With limited private investment inflows in a high-risk environment, Africa depended heavily on official capital flows -foreign aid from the developed country's governments and concessional loans from international financial institutions, particularly the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). To respond to the development crisis, lending financial institutions and official donors increased aid flows. It encouraged empirical research largely supported by the international development community. In the literature, it focused broadly on three interrelated areas: understanding the nature of Africa's slow and episodic growth -short spurts of growth and its collapses; explaining the causes of slow growth; and suggesting policy and development strategies to address the problem.
In 1981, the World Bank issued an influential report, Accelerated Development in SubSaharan Africa: An Agenda for Action (World Bank, 1981) , known as the Berg Report after the lead author of the report, Elliot Berg. The report was prepared at the request of the African Governors at the World Bank. It unveiled the World Bank's recommendation for a new strategic approach that emphasized need for policy and structural adjustment. Adjustment lending programs were controversial soon after their conception and implementation. Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, African governments reluctantly accepted SAPs imposed on them as conditions for financial assistance. Many African governments, with limited alternative options, embarked on reforms under the auspices of the World Bank and the IMF. Implementation of SAPs and SAF programs in practice was poor. Only a small number of governments completed agreed reform measures.
By the early 1990s it had become evident that SAPs were not working as expected. At the same time, Africa's external debt mounted and became unmanageable. Under political pressures and the successful debt relief movement led by civil society groups and networks of nongovernmental organizations, the World Bank first responded by establishing a new financial assistance instrument, the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) debt initiative in 1996 followed by Enhanced-HIPC in 1999 (World Bank, 1998 , and 1999 . Of the total 40 countries under HIPC, 33 were from Africa. The HIPC and debt relief initiative has been seen as successful in reducing the debt overhangs of many heavily indebted countries (World Bank, 2011) . In many respects, the HIPC initiative was an outcome of the debate and concerns for growth and development in Africa. The end of the debt crisis, improved economic policies, better democratic and accountable government, the changing relationships with the international communities, and more favorable external environment began to turn Africa around from stagnant to growth.
Africa's renewed growth has spawned first the interest of development financial institutions such as the World Bank and followed by the media and business community. Reflecting and speculating on the positive developments much earlier than the media and the late arrival of the corporate sector, the World Bank issued a report at the turn of the century with a provocative title, Can Africa Claim the 21 st Century (World Bank, 2000) . The Report challenges African governments to improve economic management, reform economic and governance institutions, microeconomic structural change to increase competitiveness, diversify economies, reduce aid dependence, and strengthen partnerships through better environment for private and public investment. Africa's continued growth has generated policy relevant questions. Is This section analyzes Africa's long-run patterns of growth and discusses some of the stylized facts and features. The analysis is based on time-series data on GDP, per capita GDP (constant USD 2005) and their growth rates from 1960 to 2014 for 45 of 49 subSaharan African countries. Djibouti, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia, and South Sudan are not included in the sample for lack of data. In addition, quantitative and qualitative indicators related to policy implementation and the quality of policy, institutions, business and regulatory environments have also been used. The 55-year period covers Africa's growth experience since data became available albeit not complete in the earlier years, the immediate post-independence period, the first oil shock, the plunge of commodity prices and deteriorating terms of trade, the decades when African economies collapsed, conflict erupted, the introduction of structural reforms, the recently observed growth recovery and the turn-around, and the 2008-2009 global financial and economic. All the data are from the World Bank, World Development Indicators database, unless otherwise noted. Because the primary interest here is in examining the representative country, unweighted country-level data are used in the aggregate analysis. 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 to those of Southeast Asian countries (World Bank, World Development Indicators). The strong performance began to change in the mid-1970s and trended downward with negative or zero growth in some years. As the fitted polynomial trend line in Figure 1 shows, Africa experienced economic stagnation and decline for two decades. With annual population growth averaging more than 2 percent during this period, per capita income growth turns negative ( Figure 2 ).
As a consequence of growth collapses and long-term stagnation, Africa's per capita income level declined by more than 20 percent between 1974 and 1994 ( Figure 3 ). Per capita income reversed to the level of immediate post-independence in the early 1960s. It was not until late 1990s that per capita income began to rise again. The recovery has been persistent and sustained both in terms of aggregate GDP growth and growth in real per capita income. The mean per capita income shows a slow positive long-term trend. Average per capita income for Africa as a whole has recovered from the long period of economic stagnation. Figure 3 also shows a trajectory of growth above the long-term exponential trend by the mid-2000s.
Long-run patterns of growth for Africa as a whole exhibit U-shaped trends both in GDP and per capita GDP with noticeable accelerations and decelerations over shorter periods. There are however significant variations of growth over different shorter periods. Table 1 below presents Africa's average annual GDP and per capita GDP growth rates in five different shorter periods: a period of strong growth (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) ; a period of decline and stagnation ; and a period of recovery and accelerated growth 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000-2008 and 2009-2014) . In the immediate post-independence period growth ranged from 5-7 percent with the mean of 5 percent a year. The strong growth performance collapsed followed the firs oil shock in the early1970s. For more than two decades Africa experienced economic decline, episodic growth -a cycle of shortterm growth spurts and collapses -and stagnation in general. GDP grew on average less than 2 percent a year, which is below population growth. Consequently, per capita growth turned negative. By early 1990s, the level of per capita income was below the level in the early 1970s. During this long period of economic stagnation, many African countries faced macroeconomic instability, failed structural reforms, external debt crisis, political and violent conflicts and some countries, civil wars.
Arica's growth patterns began to change by the second half of the 1990s. [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] , is only 0.6 percent lower than the rate prior to the crisis; it is slightly below five percent. According to several sources (IMF, World Bank, the African Development Bank, the OECD, and the UNDP) Africa's growth outlook is expected to be in the range of 5 to 6 percent in the near term.
Growth volatility is another stylized fact of African economies, particularly during the long period of decline and stagnation. The coefficients of variation (Table 1) indicate that the volatility of GDP growth during the decades of stagnation is three times the level of the recent growth period, 0.9 versus 0.3 in GDP growth and 2.0 versus 0.8 in per capita GDP growth. Arbache and Page (2007b) argued that Africa's volatile growth reflects a pattern of alternating accelerations and decelerations, rather than random variations of growth around the long-run trend, a pattern of episodic growths and collapses suggested by Ndulu (2007) . According to Arbache and Page, this pattern growth matters for economic and social outcomes beyond the direct consequences on the rate of growth. It makes it more difficult to sustain growth as it increases uncertainty and risk for both domestic and foreign investment. Arbache, Go, and Page (2008) , however, found in their data that there is a "structural break" in the growth series that occurred between 1995 and 1997. They concluded that there is indeed an acceleration of growth in Africa in general. African countries are increasingly avoiding economic collapses. Africa may be at a turning point.
B. Country-Level Growth Patterns
The above analyzes Africa's growth performance as a whole across time. But Africa is vast and diverse. The high degree of growth volatility implies that variations can be both across time and across countries. Disaggregating Africa whole into parts may provide additional insights to certain questions. For example, is Africa's growth concentrated in certain types of economies, such as oil-producing or natural resource-intensive countries, in large or relatively higher income countries? How widespread is the recent growth experience? How sustainable is current growth? This section examines country-level growth patterns to attempt to shed light on these questions. Figure 4 below shows four different groups of countries characterized by GDP growth ranges: negative growth, positive but less than 3 percent, between 3 and 5 percent, and growth over 5 percent. They are divided into three time periods reflecting the U-shaped trend: immediate post-independence, decline and stagnation, recovery and accelerated growth period since the turning point. Prior to the oil shock, almost half of the economies in Africa had average annual growth rate higher than 5 percent. Nearly half of them grew by more than 5 percent (for example Botswana, Gabon, Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Zimbabwe). The 20-year period following the oil shock, and subsequent structural reforms, misgovernance and violent conflicts, the number of countries with growth higher than 5 percent was cut in half, from 14 to 7. Seven countries registered negative growth (Angola, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Mozambique, Nigeria) and one-third had less than 2 percent growth, including previously higher growth countries, such as Cote d'Ivoire and South Africa.
Since 1995 through 2014, a period that included the 2008-2009 global financial crisis and recession, the number of African economies that achieved growth of higher than 5 percent more than doubled, from 7 to 17. Some of them (for example, Angola, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia) have had growth rivaling and even higher than that of the presently established larger emerging market economies. However, a quarter of the region, 11 countries, still grew less than 2 percent. Other remaining countries have had moderate growth of 3-4 percent. Africa has turned around from stagnation to growth at various speeds. The current growth is widespread but not uniform across all countries. Nearly two-thirds of the countries experienced growth of more than 4 percent a year over the last 15 years. Several of them are oil-exporting countries; Angola, Chad, Nigeria, and Equatorial Guinea grew by more than 16 times. There are also low-income, non-oil exporting, and post-conflict countries whose average income has doubled, such as Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Liberia (more than quintuple). But the growth is not uniform across the region. There are countries whose average per capita income is actually lower in 2014 than in 1995. This includes countries such as Burundi, Central Africa Republic, Eritrea, Zimbabwe, and Gabon (oil-exporting country).
The country-level variations of per capita income are relatively low. The coefficient of variation ranging from the high of 0.29 to 0.22 for a few oil-exporting countries like Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria to relative low coefficient of variation for most countries. The median coefficient is 0.13. This is consistent with the overall slow, moderate change in per capita income at the aggregate level across time (Figure 3 ). On the other hand, the growth rate of per capita income is highly volatile. Its coefficient of variation ranges from -42.1 to 19.4 for Madagascar and Gambia. The median coefficient -1974 1975--1984 1985--1994 1995--1999 
IV. Categorizing Countries: New Emerging Growth Economies in Africa
In the literature of late 1990s and early 2000s many economists raised questions about how widespread is growth in Africa and whether it can be sustained. Gunning (1999a and 1999b) and Kenny and Williams (2000) provided a good literature review and summary of many growth-regression empirical studies. Some observed that commodity booms and favorable terms of trade in the 1990s were factors driving Africa's growth, or the fact that Africa had been in decline and stagnation for a long time contributing to a more speedy growth once recovery happened. Others suggested what Collier and Gunning called "destiny factors", such as geography like being landlocked countries or tropical climate and diseases (Sachs and Warner, 1997) , and ethnic division (Easterly, (1997) .
So, how widespread is Africa's recent growth. To answer this question, a matrix of two by four is constructed as shown in Table 3 . Countries are separated into two groups: strong growth, 4 percent or higher; and weak growth, less than 4 percent. In each category of growth, the countries' economies are further divided into four sub-groups: non-oil exporting; oil exporting; land locked economies; and post-conflict countries. Each country is designated by its growth performance and categorized by one of the four possible types of economies. Countries can fall into one or more types, for example Rwanda is a strong growth, non-oil exporting, landlocked, and post-conflict country. To simplify in cases such as this, the country is arbitrarily placed into only one of the four types. Based on growth data between 2000 and 2014, Table 3 shows that 28 of the 45 countries have growth rate of 4 percent or higher. They comprise all four types of economies. Although 7 of the 9 strong growth economies are oil exporting, they are not predominant. Eight non-oil exporting and ten landlocked countries also have strong growth. Being a landlocked country does not seem to destine a country to low growth. Landlocked countries, such as Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zambia have registered long-term growth ranging between 6 and 8 percent. The strong growth group also includes three of the more recent post-conflict countries -Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Democratic Republic of Congo. The evidence suggests that even low-income, fragile, and conflicted affected countries can grow. Countries can overcome the "destiny factors" especially natural resources and geography. (Table 3) . Are there differences between higher growth economies and low growth economies in terms of economic fundamentals and other economic performance variables, such as the quality of policies and institutions? Can African countries be meaningfully categorized into country groups or clusters? Answers to these questions may shed light on whether growth is robust and sustainable.
By the early 2000s, Africa's renewed growth began to receive attention in the "Africa rising" literature. A number of international investors, corporate leaders, commentaries and business and development books discussed potential opportunities in Africa.
McKinsey Global Institute (2010) published an optimistic review of the continent's economic outlook with the catchy title of "Lions on the move: The progress and potential of African economies." Others suggested emerging "frontier markets", a "second generation" of emerging market economies, and an emerging Africa (Nellor, 2008; Mahajan, 2009; Miguel, 2009; Radelet, 2010; and Berman, 2013) .
The idea of Africa's emerging economies is an outgrowth of the concept of emerging markets. Developed and developing countries can be distinguished in terms of income and the level and sophistication of markets, among other indicators. A conventional approach adopted by international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF is to classify developing economies based on income level. It serves the purpose of lending operations for the World Bank and the IMF because the eligibility for different types of concessional loans the institutions offer is generally determined by the country's income level. The country typology is also useful for analytical work and for forecasting purpose. Being able to differentiate different types of economies can be importan for business and potential foreign investors t. Arguably, the emergence of new markets can affect investment decision, particularly in the context of low and middle-income developing countries. In 1980, Antoine van Agtmael of the International Financial Corporations (IFC), the private investment arm of the World Bank Group established to support business and private enterprises in developing countries, coined the term "emerging markets" to refer to developing countries with stock markets that were beginning to have the features of the mature stock markets in developed, industrial countries.
Financial markets in particular have made use of the concept of emerging markets. Several emerging market indices and investment funds have been established (see for example, Master Card Emerging Markets Index 2008, Emerging and Growth-Leading Economies, FTSE Emerging Markets, and the IMF list of emerging market economies). Standard & Poor's which took over the emerging market financial indices from the IFC in 2000 compiled a list of countries called "frontier markets" to describe those markets that are less liquid than those in the emerging markets. In the context of sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa is the only country included in all emerging market groups, because it meets the criteria of financial market development. Kenya, Nigeria, and Senegal are included in some groups. Emerging markets, later also called emerging (market) economies, are loosely defined as a group of rapidly growing developing countries that are reasonably integrated into the global economy. In general, four characteristics have been adopted as defining features of emerging economies: low to middle income countries with high growth; an emerging financial or equity capital market; reasonable integration to the global economy via trade and investment; and rule-based governance and accountability.
During the two decades of economic stagnation, emerging markets as a taxonomical category for most African countries received relatively little attention by business leaders and investors. Today, Africa in a broad sense has turned around. It has a new economic landscape with accelerated growth and its volatility in recent years, imply more opportunities, higher risks and higher returns for investors. It has shown resiliency and continuing a growth trajectory of 5-6 percent (IMF, 2015, African Development, OECD, and UNDP, 2015) following the global financial economic crisis suggesting that growth can persist. However, Africa is diverse and its diversity is increasing; varying growth performance across countries is also characteristic. This potentially can lead to formation of country groups or clusters based on economic outcomes, for example high and lowgrowth of economies, quality of institutions and governance, across the conventional classification by income level or geography. The concept of emerging market economies offers one such grouping (for other suggested approaches, see, for example Nielsen, 2011; Vazquez and Sumner, 2012) .
However, the idea of defining an emerging market economy predominantly to countries' financial or capital markets is narrow and leaves out other key features that characterize emerging economies. Kehl (2007) discussed the inadequacy and inaccuracy of the conception of emerging markets that rely mainly on the existence of institutions to support a capital market or a stock or portfolio market. She argued that this has disproportionately left out many African countries and it has a negative impact on Africa. Foreign investment can be important for domestic growth and being considered an emerging market adds value to any "county brand" value attracting business and investment. Based on survey evidence by the United Nations (United Nations Industrial Development Organization -UNIDO, 2003) about motivations, operations, and perceptions of business leaders and investors, Kehl applied a cross sectional time series analysis using ten political institutions and economy indicators. She identified a list of 19 emerging and upcoming emerging markets in Africa. Nellor (2008) has also observed that a number of sub-Saharan countries were beginning to attract investors to their financial markets, based on a number of macroeconomic and financial indicators. Based on the analysis of a number of economic and political variables, Radelet (2010) similarly concluded that a number of African countries exhibit the characteristics of emerging economies. He identified 17 African countries as emerging economies and another 6 as "threshold" emerging economies. Radelet's list excluded nine oil-exporting countries; many of them could be considered as emerging economies. The descriptive statistics available to Radelet at the time were from mid-2000s. The data Kehl used for her econometric analysis were late 1990s and early 2000s.
The concept of emerging market economies can be seen as an approach to categorize economies into separate groups or clusters based on some objective criteria. Applying the broader concept of emerging markets to more recent data (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) and using average annual growth rates between 2000 and 2014 as an overall objective and proxy measure of economic outcome, a list of 28 strong-growth countries achieving a growth rate of 4 percent or higher are considered emerging economies (Table 3) . They are separated from the non-emerging economies by growth performance. An annual 4 percent growth in the context of Africa is about two percent per capita growth. It is a moderate rate of per capita growth, but it is what has conventionally been a benchmark and a common standard indicating relatively good performance, when sustained over time. It means a doubling of income in 36 years, fewer than two generations.
There is one exception. South Africa, with growth rate of 3.2 percent is added to the group of emerging economies because it has already been universally considered an emerging market economy. The emerging market group identified in this paper turns out to be identical to Radelet's list, if oil-exporting countries and what Radelet considered threshold emerging except Senegal are included. This grouping is very similar to Kehl's with the exception that Gabon, The Gambia, Madagascar, and Senegal are on her "upcoming emerging" list but are not on the emerging market group in this paper.
If growth is robust countries with strong growth (emerging economies), should have different -stronger -economic performance in terms of key economic fundamentals and policies and institutions that support growth than low growth, non-emerging economies. One can infer that growth is associated with improved economic fundamentals, sound policies and institutions rather than just the luck of favorable commodity prices and more international aid? Table 4 presents the comparison of means of selected economic variables between two groups of economies. One group comprises 29 growth emerging economies; the other 16 non-emerging economies (Table 3) . Eighteen variables are chosen. They represent major indicators that business leaders and investors would likely use, among other things, to guide their decision on whether to invest in a particular country. These performance or outcome indicators capture economic fundamentals, macroeconomic policy variables, the extent to which policies are implemented, and the quality of institutional support for reforms, and the control of corruption and good governance. The data are from the World Bank, World Development Indicator dataset. The indicators of the quality of policy execution, institutions, and governance rely on the World Bank's Country Policy and Institution Assessment, which measure the quality on a scale of 1 to 6, with 1 as the lowest score and 6 the highest.
First, the study compares the means of the selected variables between the group of 29 emerging growth economies, including 7 oil-exporting economies and the group of 16 non-emerging economies. The results are shown on the second and third columns of Table 4 . The statistical t-test shows that the means of the two groups in savings, domestic investment and foreign direct investment are different and significant at 5 percent level. Similar results hold for all the variables measuring quality of policy implementation, institutions, and governance. However, the t-test indicates that there is no difference between the means of the two groups in terms of inflation, government consumption, debt, and current account balance. Second, to test the extent to which oil-rich countries affect the results, the 9 oil-exporting economies, 7 in the emerging growth group and 2 from the non-emerging, are dropped from the sample. The t-test shows that there are differences in the means in savings and domestic investment (as in the case of all countries) but no difference in foreign direct investment. This suggests that once oil-rich countries are removed from the sample, there is statistically no difference between the means of foreign direct investment between the two groups of economies. The means of the inflation variable between the two groups is different and statistical significance once the oil-rich countries are dropped.
The results in terms of quality of policies, institution, and governance are the same whether oil-exporting economies are included in the sample. Except for the foreign direct investment and inflation variables, the selected performance variables are not sensitive to whether oil-rich countries are included.
IV. Conclusion
In the literature on growth empirics, there are many cross-country econometric studies that attempt to find some universal causal mechanisms that explain why some countries grow faster than the others. In this type of global studies, Africa is typically included in the reduced form, growth regression by a regional dummy variable. Two general distinctions in the causes of slow growth for Africa emerged from this literature: between "destiny factors", particularly geography and ethnic division; and those that are policy and institutions dependent, such as sound macroeconomic policies structural reforms, and good governance.
Is slow growth intrinsic in Africa? Based on the empirical findings in this paper (Table  3) , which benefit from a more recent and longer dataset since the turnaround in the mid1990s, the answer is negative. Africa's growth has been widespread. Many countries have managed to achieve strong growth despite geography -being landlocked and tropical climate -and ethnic division. They do not appear to be binding constraints. A majority of the growth economies and some of the rapidly growing ones in the past 15 years, such as Botswana, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda, are landlocked countries. In the much longer-term, geographic locations that are prone to adverse impact of climate change can be a potential factor limiting growth. Not well endowed in oil or natural resources does not inevitably slow down growth. A majority of the growth economies are not natural resource or oil rich countries. It is equally evident that the lack of natural resources is not intrinsically a curse, 15 percent of the growth economies in this study are oil-exporting countries.
If destiny or intrinsic factors are not good explanations for slow growth and stagnation, policy and institution dependent factors are. As a group, growth economies, in terms of economic fundamentals, policies, institutions and governance, are statistically different from slow growth and stagnant economies. The differences are especially distinct and significant, particularly in the areas of policy management and implementation, quality of institutions and governance. They are measured by qualitative or categorical measurements that are not easily integrated into global growth regression analytics. It should also be pointed out that statistical inference by comparison of the means of two groups of countries in terms of different variables does not imply causality. The findings should be interpreted differently than as determinants of growth as in the case of growth regression models. The findings simply suggest that growth economies as a group are statistically different and associated with better economic fundamentals, certain policies, and quality of institutions and governance.
The "rising Africa" literature, to a large extent, came from the corporate sector's interest in Africa and it tends to be country or area specific unlike the literature on cross-country econometric studies. This can be complementary. Though Africa's turning point has occurred; but Africa's growth, as shown in this study, has not been uniform. It is volatile and uneven. Thus, for business and investors, the concept of emerging market or growth economies can be useful. It signals to business leaders and investors of the challenges of new markets that hold promise, but also higher risk and returns. Moreover, it provides an opportunity to rid the syndrome of "Africa as a country" that has affected the media and public perception to the frustration of many leaders and ordinary citizens of Africa. Their economies are misleadingly lumped together when Africa is treated as a single analytical unit and over-generalized. The analytical practice of treating "Africa as a country" can be misleading and inaccurate.
Is Africa's growth robust? Can it be sustained? These are more difficult questions to answer. The association between strong growth and the quality of policies, institutions and governance over a 15-year period (Table 4) seems to lend support to the view that growth in Africa's emerging economies has been robust. As to the second question, economic development theory suggests that to be sustained, growth has to be accompanied by structural transformation driven by productivity gains. To date, little of the transformation process suggested by textbook explanations is evident. The jury is still out and it is a challenge for continuing research and for Africa's business and political leaders.
